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The Law’s Homogeneity
Challenged by Heterogenisation through Ethics and Economics
Abstract. The Atlantic civilisation has over the past centuries been composed of two defi nitely diverging ethoses 
and social philosophical inspirations, differing also by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps most 
conspicuous today as to be seen in the difference between approaches to life as a struggle and to law as a game 
within it. No doubt, on the one hand, there prevails the rest of (1) a European Christian tradition, characterised by 
communal ethos, with provision of rights as counter-balanced by obligations, in which priority is given to the 
peace of society and a traditional culture of virtues is promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge 
human rights, with a focus on prevention of and remedy to actual harms. It is such an environment within which 
homo ludens as a type of the playful human who is at the same time dutiful and carefree–entirely joyful–constitutes 
a limiting value. If and insofar as struggle appears at all on the scene, it is mostly recognised as a fi ght for 
excellence. As a pathologic version, the loneliness of those staying away from participation may lead to psychical 
disorders which require subconscious re-compensation, the symbolic sanctioning of which was once accomplished 
by the psycho-analysis. On the other, there has also evolved (2) an Americanised individualistic atomisation of 
society, expecting order out of chaos, with absolutisation of rights ascribed to individuals, all closed back in 
loneliness. As an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements, and unrestrained struggle becomes a part 
of any normal course of life with the deployment of human rights just to neutralise (if not disintegrate) community-
centred standards. “Life is struggle”–the hero of our brave new world enunciates the words as a commonplace 
with teeth clenched, convinced that life is barely anything but fi ght against anybody else (as an improved version, 
hailed as civilisatory advancement as re-actualising–under the pretext of maximising the chances of–the ominous 
bellum omnium contra omnes, formulated once in early modern England). Starting from the common deployment 
of some symbolical “cynical acid” in foundation of modern formal law but developing through differentiated ways 
of how to search for reason and systemicity in law, the conceptual and methodical effect of this very division is 
shown in the paper within the perspectives for curing malpractice in law and also in the role of ethics in economy.
Keywords: modern formal law, Europeanism, Americanisation, malpractice, ethics in economy, tendential unity
1. The Formalism of Law in Modernity
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the 
classics of the formative years of American legal realism, defi ned his programmatic stand 
almost one hundred and fi fteen years ago as follows: legal notions have to be washed with 
“cynical acid” so that they can serve as genuinely legal concepts, stripped of theological 
and moral (etc.) overtones.1 Because, as he saw it, “[m]oral predilections must not be 
allowed to infl uence our minds in settling legal distinctions”.2 Thus the question arises: is 
someone calling for cynicism inevitably cynical himself?
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We know that such approach was called functionalism at that time. It held as a basic 
tenet that each and every component of the social complex has to serve with full strength in 
its own place, as it is just its specifi c particularity as distinguished from anything else that 
may have motivated its coming into a separate existence.
It is the ideal of functionalism in law, which modern formal law was invented and 
developed to institutionalise. Historically, this was the product of the European 
bureaucratism (which gained strength from the early 19th century) that began to assimilate 
the state structure to its organisatory needs with a previously unheard-of effi ciency.3 As its 
fi rst step, law was thoroughly formalised to develop its particular homogeneity. In return, 
law became autonomous; with distinguished particularity;4 to function in a specifi c way. 
This necessitated its own responsibility in overall co-operation, with interactions in any 
direction regarding any complex.5
Thereby, functionalism is also expressive of an instrumental tendency, which is a 
theoretical conclusion of the fact that, from now on, modern social existence can only be 
explained as the self-realisation of straightforward co-operation of partial totalities, 
relatively separated yet thoroughly connected on the plane of the whole totality. This is 
what George Lukács and his circle once described as the domination of homogeneous 
autonomies developed on the terrain of undivided heterogeneity emerging in everyday 
existence, in which each and every complex (which has separated out from the total 
complex by advancing its particularities) becomes both specifi ed and, operating according 
to its own criteria as one given homogeneity, relatively independent from the total complex 
(while facing the risk of confrontation).6 On the fi eld of macro-sociological theory-building, 
Niklas Luhmann, too, arrived at a similar conclusion one decade later, formulating the 
category of Ausdifferenzierung as a theoretical foundation stone, to indicate separation and 
isolation, in the course of which the specifi c operation of law would appear with a binary 
code, responding with the exclusive alternative of either “lawful” or “unlawful”.7
All this anticipated the chance of dysfunctionality in actual operation, running against 
the values originally designed to be implemented. For, as has been long known, scholarship 
has considered such occurrences to be mere mistakes, marginal in practice.8 At the same 
3 Cf., e.g. Gladden, E. N.: A History of Public Administration. I–II. London, 1972. and Finer, 
S. E.: The History of Government. I–III. Oxford, 1997.
4 For the qualifying term “distinctively legal”, see Selznick, Ph.: The Sociology of Law. In Sills, 
D. L. (ed.): International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York, 1968. 51.
5 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Recht. Acta Juridica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae, 26 (1984), 235–241.
6 In philosophical elaboration of an initially aesthetical origin, see, by Lukács, G.: Über die 
Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik. Neuwied am Rhein–Berlin, 1967, Über die Besonderheit als 
Kategorie der Ästhetik [1957]. In Lukács, G.: Probleme der Ästhetik. Neuwied–Berlin, 1969. 537 et 
seq., Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 1–2. Neuwied am Rhein–Berlin-Spandau, 1963. as well as Zur 
Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins (ed.: Benseler, F.). Darmstadt, 1984–1986. From the circle of 
disciples, see also Heller, Á.: Everyday Life. London, 1984.
7 From Niklas Luhmann, e.g. Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts. Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtstheorie. Frankfurt am Main, 1981.
8 It is by far not a mere chance that Marxism was the fi rst in the modern age to develop a theory 
of alienation, addressing it as a core issue of social scientifi c thought. Cf., among others, Israel, J.: 
Alienation. From Marx to Modern Sociology: A Macrosociological Analysis. Atlantic Highlands, New 
Jersey, 1979, as well as, by Varga, Cs.: Chose juridique et réifi cation en droit. Archives de Philosophie 
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time, however, theoretical description has defi ned the ontological result by some mutuality 
in operation, forming a “tendential unity”, which is a sine qua non of the operability of–
and, as such, will at any time determine–the total whole. This Lukácsian recognition is also 
expressed by the fact that in his social ontology, language and law are from the outset 
distinguished from the rest of the complexes of social being (taken as the total operation of 
the total complex consisting of partial complexes). Or, language and law are held to be 
mere intermediators that do not operate with their own values, for they exclusively mediate 
among values taken from other (non-mediatory) complexes. By the help of instrumental 
values, they may operate as wedged in the process, at most strengthening the effi ciency of 
their mediatory role. Of course, inspired by historical materialism rooted in economic 
determinism, Lukács presumed a component able to play an over-dominant role in the total 
process hic et nunc. But having arrived at social ontology from Bolshevik revolutionism, 
the aged Lukács had already realised that hegemonic determination through any complex 
becoming totally dominant (e.g. the economy in general, or politics in transitory or 
pathological states, in the shadow of which no further partial complex could any longer 
play the proper role to be played) would inevitably harm and distort the whole totality,9 
with lasting effect on most of its occurrences.10
2. Intertwining: A Case Study
Let us raise the question: what practices may arise in our day from such and similar 
recognitions? If we consider only the alternatives of medical law, i.e. of making malpractice 
a subject of civil action, one of the three solutions that follow may emerge in principle: no 
responsibility and no justiciability in practice (as was once practised under the aegis of the 
“actually existing system of socialism” in Hungary and the entire region); or responsibility 
made almost absolute (as evolved as a result of the self-assertion of lawyering in the United 
States of America); or personal or institutional responsibility enforceable via specifi c media 
made up by the medico-legal profession (idealised as a perspective for Hungary after the 
fall of Communism).
Well, assessing the fi eld from such extreme poles (with some sensitivity to our 
domestic traditions11) within such a threefold perspective of past, present, and possible 
du Droit, 25 (1980), 385–411. and »Thing« and Reifi cation in Law. In Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in 
Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1985 (1998). Appendix, 160–184.
9 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Towards the Ontological Foundation of Law (Some Theses on the Basis of 
Lukács’ Ontology). Rivista Internazionale di Filosofi a del Diritto, 60 (1983), 127–142 and in: 
Filosofi a del Derecho y Problemas de Filosofi a Social. X. México, 1984. 203–216 and <http://www.
bibliojuridica.org/libros/3/1051/20.pdf>, as well as Autonomy and Instrumentality of Law in a 
Superstructural Perspective. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 40 (1999), 213–235.
10 Cf., e.g. by Varga, Cs.: Transition to Rule of Law. On the Democratic Transformation in 
Hungary. Budapest, 1995. and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/transition-to-rule-of-
law-on-the-democratic-transformation-in-hungary-1995/> and Transition? To Rule of Law? 
Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in Central and Eastern Europe. Pomáz, 2008. 
and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-transition-to-rule-of-law-%E2%80%93-
constitutionalism-and-transitional-justice-challenged-in-central-and-eastern-europe-2008/>.
11 A balanced middle-of-the-road stand is presented by, e.g. Kapocsi, E.: Az orvosi hivatás 
autonómiájának etikai vonatkozásai [Ethical aspects of the autonomy of the medical profession]. Lege 
Artis Medicinae, 10 (2000), 358–364. Cf. also Kövesi, E.: Orvosi etika és gazdaságosság – 
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future, we can take the following consequences into account in light of today’s procedures 
and of prospects they will become further Americanised:12 (1) the assumption of 
responsibility enforced by lawsuits will be built as an auxiliary cost into the expenses of 
health care, which must result in the overall rise in its budget; (2) the actual accrual of 
health costs will be taken from the proper fi eld of health care, only to be divided among 
suing clients and the lawyerly caste; in response to which (3) on the part of both the health 
supplier and the client, further juridifying mechanisms (mediations and formalisations) 
alien to the original ethos and inherent rationality of health care will be subsequently 
wedged in the previously purely health-centred processes, a condition that may shake its 
very foundations through a parasitical intrusion. With legal safety becoming a consideration 
in focus, new practices (eliminating procedures and risky choices once generally accepted 
in practice) may be introduced. Finally, all this (4) further professionalises the practices of 
the medical profession, cutting up traditional treatment processes into artifi cially isolated 
partial processes. That is, the medical profession will reduce both frustration and predictable 
damages by deploying additional (cost-increasing) staff with professional “mind-healing” 
(psychological) specialisations in the process (as the paradoxical after-effect of the sheer 
artifi ciality and exaggerated bureaucratisation that arises from the depersonalisation of the 
entire procedure while in fact worsening the patient’s prospects to heal)–while needless to 
say, having no genuinely positive effect as to the overall destination of the whole 
undertaking in question.
In the fi nal analysis, all this will not in the slightest degree increase the actual (and 
morally reasonable) responsibility to be borne by social healthcare for actions that are 
achievable within the given society’s tolerance and funding limits.
Or, all it equals to saying that this is probably the most costly outcome both fi nancially 
and also regarding its erosive effect on the medical ethos, and will result in an external 
control of health care, alien to it and unduly overcoming it, driven solely by lawyerly 
arrivism and profi teering as guided by professional imperialism. Yet, at the same time this 
proves to be the least effective solution. All that notwithstanding, it still seems to step by 
step subdue the entire medical organisation, whereas this course has by no means been 
necessary. Two decades ago, at the beginning of our transition from communism, its 
feasibility and acceptability was still an open issue in Hungary, at a time when external 
pressure by a professional push–accompanied by an internal agitation to introduce and 
tolerate an American-type lawyerly rule–fi rst became perceptible in the country.13
összefüggés-e vagy ellentmondás? [Medical ethics and economicalness: are they in correlation or 
contradiction?] Valóság, 39 (1996) 9, 26–29; Dósa, Á.: Felelősség vagy biztosítás? [Liability or 
insurance?] Lege Artis Medicinae, 6 (1996), 262–265 as well as Balázs, P.: Orvosi etika és gazdasági 
realitások [Medical ethics and economic facts]. Valóság, 40 (1997) 4, 16–28. For an international 
background, see also Hennekeuser, H.-H.: Zwischen Ethik und Wirtschaftlichkeitsgebot: Der leitende 
Krankenhausarzt im Spannungsfeld von Patientenbetreuung und Ökonomie. In: Jahrbuch für 
Wissenschaft und Ethik, 3. Berlin–New York, 1998. 141–147. As a Hungarian legal and medical 
specialist’s stand, see Dósa, Á.: Az orvos kártérítési felelőssége [The doctor’s liability for damages]. 
Budapest, 2004.
12 Cf. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 45: »L’américanisation du droit«. Paris, 2001. and 
L’américanisation des droits suisse et continentaux. Zürich, 2006.
13 As a member of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Board in the administration of József Antall, I 
initiated repeated informal debates about the issue, while our legal experts from academies and 
universities, including American advisors and Hungarian scholars of American studies, all kept quiet 
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With homogeneity heterogenised, external intervention dissipates the well-balanced 
confi guration and very substance of the structure and systemically self-reproducing 
framework of the profession it touches upon.
3. Diversity of Approaches
Considering all this both as a danger and warning14–when research is so exhaustive as to 
have a call even to devoting attention to cultural anthropological investigations of tribal 
communities of a few hundred members surviving sporadically15–, we might at last take 
notice of the fact that Atlantic civilisation, so clearly determining our near future, has been 
composed over the past centuries of two defi nitely diverging ethoses and social philosophical 
inspirations, which differ by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps most 
conspicuous today in the difference between the approaches to life as a struggle and to law 
as a game within it.
No doubt, on the one hand, there prevails a European Christian tradition, characterised 
by a communal ethos, with the provision of rights as counter-balanced by obligations, in 
which priority is given to the peace of society, and a traditional culture of virtues is 
promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge human rights, with a focus on 
prevention and remedy of actual harms. It is in such an environment that homo ludens as a 
type of playful human who is both dutiful and carefree, i.e. entirely joyful, constitutes a 
limiting value.16 If, and in so far as, struggle appears on the scene at all, it is mostly 
recognised as a fi ght for excellence. As a pathological version, the loneliness of those who 
avoid participation may lead to disorders of the psyche that require subconscious re-
compensation, the symbolic sanctioning of which (typically in the stale and excited Vienna 
of the turn of 19th and 20th centuries and by a psychologist of middle-class women shut 
into self-consuming idleness) Sigmund Freud accomplished. On the other hand, there has 
also evolved an Americanised individualistic atomisation of society, expecting order out of 
about the risks. Examining the spirit of those days with the easy wisdom of hindsight, C. Dupré–
Importing the Law in Post-communist Transitions. The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right 
to Human Dignity. Oxford–Portland Oregon, 2003. 57.–characterised the image of the West formed 
by the domestic Left (having turned to libertinism [next to nihilistic anarchism] after the fall of 
Communism) by concluding that there was “a glorifi ed and idealised vision of the West and of liberal 
law” also referring to the writing of the Lukácsian Budapest-school in-exile-representative, Fehér, F.: 
Imagining the West. Thesis Eleven, (1995) 42, 52–68, which “did not correspond much to the reality”.
14 Not by chance, there are intermediary proposals for solution today. Cf. the initiatives by 
Nagy, L.–Kahler, F.: Közvetítő (mediátor) felállításának szükségességéről az állampolgárok és a 
gyógyító intézmények (orvosok) közötti vitás kérdések peren kívüli megoldására [On the necessity of 
involving a mediator for the extra-judicial solution of confl icts between citizens and medical 
institutions]. Magyar Jog, 42 (1995), 229–231 and Heuer, O.: Konfl iktuskezelés a betegjogi 
sérelmeknél: Az egészségügyi közvetítő eljárásokról [Confl ict management in cases of the violation 
of patients’ rights: on mediatory processes in health care]. Lege Artis Medicinae, 11 (2000), 80–83 
and <http://www.lam.hu/folyoiratok/lam/0101/11.htm>.
15 See, e.g. as the fi eld work of a tribal legal anthropologist, deceased at an early age, Akalu, A.: 
The Nuer View of Biological Life. Nature and Sexuality in the Experience of the Ethiopian Nuer. 
Stockholm, 1989.
16 Huizinga, J.: Homo ludens. A Study of the Play-element in Culture [Proeve eener bepaling 
van het spel-element der cultuur, 1938]. London, 1949.
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chaos, with absolutisation of rights ascribed to individuals, all closed back in loneliness. As 
an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements, and unrestrained struggle 
becomes a normal course of life with human rights deployed to neutralise and disintegrate 
community-centred standards. “Life is struggle”–the hero of our brave new world enunciates 
it as a commonplace with teeth clenched, convinced that life is hardly anything but a fi ght 
against anybody else (in an improved version, hailed–under the pretext of maximising 
chances–as civilisatory advancement by re-actualising the ominous bellum omnium contra 
omnes, formulated by Thomas Hobbes in early modern England). Following such examples, 
feminist self-reliance may stand for a contemporary pathological ideal type, struggling 
herself back into unhappy loneliness by engaging in the fi ght with her jaw and the further 
abilities she has targeted.
It is mostly such and similar stimuli that nourish our uneasy experience of the 
globalised present, with ideals of order, standards and cultural patterns that transform status 
struggles (based on gender, colour, etc.) into struggles in law, and which, under the aegis of 
law, support disproportionate fi nancial indemnifi cation for alleged psychological injuries so 
as to gain material fortune, and which thereby replace collective solidarity by individual 
arrivism and disintegrate cohesive forces by growing societal atomisation.
Is it really such an outcome that we have wanted in our nation building through the 
centuries? Is it really this that is worth searching for now, when we are freed to shape our 
fate, given the chance to change the past regime?
For want of other points of reference in our spiritually emptying world (almost without 
unconditional respect for, and adherence to, values), let me recall a few lessons taught by 
historical legal anthropology17 and the millennial message of legal philosophy,18 while 
referring uniformly to the signifi cance of the moment of trust in the mechanisms of feedback 
and the necessity of complexity in social existence. Well, both in early Jewish, Islamic 
(etc.) traditions and even nowadays in surviving autochthonous cultures (which lack in 
resources and, therefore, stipulate maximum effi ciency as the condition for survival), we 
can observe the compulsion through two sorts of axiomatism with clearly ideological 
operation, which organise human choices into a framework unquestionably ready-made 
from the outset.19 One of these perspectival optima is the idea of proportionality with self-
moderation, based on the priority of public good. This spread fi rst as shalom, or the 
precedence for public peace to protect societal integrity, which, later in Roman development, 
was formulated as the dilemma of formalism expressed by the adage of summum ius, 
17 Cf., e.g. Varga, Cs.: Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold Pospíšil and the Comparative 
Study of Legal Cultures. In: Law in East and West. On the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the 
Institute of Comparative Law. Tokyo, 1988. 265–285 and »Law«, or »More or Less Legal«? Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, 34 (1992), 139–146. As a thoroughly theoretical outline, cf. also Lampe, J.: 
Grenzen des Rechtspositivismus. Eine rechtsanthropologische Untersuchung. Berlin, 1988.
18 Cf., as a call to natural law, e.g. Varga, Cs.: Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory–and the Future 
of Theoretical Legal Thought. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 50 (2009), 237–252 and in <http://akademiai.
om.hu/content/0318830q86810656/fulltext.pdf>.
19 Cf., e.g. with some of the papers collected in Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot and New York, 1992, as well as H. Szilágyi, I. (ed.): Jog és antropológia [Law and 
anthropology]. Budapest, 2000.
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summa iniuria,20 which was recognised from the Middle Ages on as the virtue of 
temperantia.21 The other is the ideal of natural law.
As to the latter, it has presumed human responsibility (in forms developed in East-Asia 
and Latin America, as well as in Christianity and Islam) for our environment as inherited 
exclusively for our temporary use, to be handed down to following generations safely in 
toto; defi ned (in its Christianised Greek–Roman version) minimum conditions (suitable to a 
formulation in sets of principles, rules, and exceptions from rules) as a comprehensive 
framework for social life in a symbolic expression of the created (or, profanely, the 
somehow organised) order: fi rst, representing the whole cosmos; then, the humanly 
observable world; later on, society; and fi nally, the individual (with responses echoed by 
both theology and politics, aetiology and cultural anthropology).
Eventually, in our secularised age, this ideal was fi rst replaced by endowing the ideal 
of natural law, unchanged in principle as transcendent to human existence, with changing 
(i.e. developing) contents [Naturrecht mit wechselndem Inhalte] at the end of the 19th 
century,22 then, by its institutionalisation as “the nature of things themselves” [Natur der 
Sache; nature des choses] by the jurisprudence of continental European countries with 
Latin or German roots after World War II,23 in order to provide guidance for the desirable 
harmony among functions in confl ict, as derivable through pondering upon all circumstances 
of the issue in question.
4. Ideal Models and Mixed Reality
Returning to the foundations of the philosophy of science, the fi rst and primary task of 
human thinking is to delineate the frameworks, boundaries and limits within which human 
action may have a context, which prompted our ancestors to search for methodological 
ways of thought. In fact, from the age of René Descartes, European civilisation reduced that 
which may be thought of at all to that which can be deduced from some unquestionable 
truths through logical (re)construction. This has led to a kind of naturalism, reminiscent of 
20 In a fi ctional elaboration, see, e.g. von Kleist, H.: Michael Kohlhaas. Aus einer alten Chronik 
[1810]. Hollfeld, 1998 and in English translation Gearey, J. (ed.) New York, 1967. For its theoretical 
treatment, Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. para. 2.3.1.8.
21 At Cicero (Tusculanes. III, 16–18), sôphrosunê may be equally realised as temperantia, 
moderatio and modestia, which he sums up as frugalitas. Cf. Labarrière, J.-L.: Sagesse et tempérance. 
In: Canto-Sperber, M. (dir.) Dictionnaire d’éthique et de philosophie morale. Paris, 1996. especially 
at 1325.
22 Stammler, R.: Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung. Eine 
sozialphilosophische Untersuchung. Leipzig, 1896, 184–188.
23 As fi rst outlines, see, above all, Villey, M.: La nature des choses. In Villey, M.: Seize essais de 
philosophie du droit. Paris, 1969. 38–59; Larenz, K.: Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft. 6. neu 
bearb. Aufl . Berlin, etc., 1991. para. 5.4.b [“Rechtsfortbildung mit Rücksicht auf die »Natur der 
Sache«”], 417. et seq.; and Coing, H.: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie. 5. Aufl . Berlin–New York, 
1993. para. IV.1; as well as La »nature des choses« et le droit. Separate issue of Annales de la Faculté 
de Droit de Toulouse, 12 (1964) 1; Noguchi, H.: Die Natur der Sache in der juristischen Argumentation. 
In: Yasaki, M. (ed.): Law in East and West. Legal Philosophies in Japan. Stuttgart, 1987. 139–147; 
and Tzitzis, St.: Controverses autour de l’idée de nature des choses et de droit naturel. Rechtstheorie, 
24 (1993), 469–483.
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naive realism patterned on the wisdom of lex mentis est lex entis,24 presuming parallelism, 
as well as correspondence, between thought and reality. Conversely, in early times, even the 
created nature of the world was conceived of in a geometrical order according to a 
mathematical ideal, inspired by the Biblical exposition “[b]ut you have disposed all things 
by measure and number and weight”.25 As a result, human thought was also confi ned to a 
mathesis universalis, posited as mere conceptual arithmetic within the presumption of an 
all-pervasive natural systemicity that could be notionalised. Through the Enlightenment’s 
combatant materialism, modelling cognition upon the pattern of refl ection was developed in 
depth, which survived, among other things, as the central epistemo-ontological pre-
supposition of Marxism, summarised and simplifi ed as the notorious Leninist theory of 
refl ection.26 Most of the unconditional hegemony of rationalism survived from all of this 
until today, haunting and questioning otherwise normal thought processes all through, up to 
pushing them to their self-dissolving extremities.27 This is the dogma according to which 
only that which is rationally justifi able can become the subject of theoretical reconstruction–
ignoring the brutal fact that, as a side-effect of modern scientifi c revolution, such a mind-set 
can only contribute to depriving man of his further qualities; for man, with his inborn 
facultases, is signifi cantly richer in emotional, intuitive, transcendent (etc.) life than is 
claimed by the idea that reduces his complexity (when assessing his self-positioning in the 
world) to one single, exclusive quality, that of alleged–and necessarily apparent–
rationality.28
This is the pattern with which the very concept of “social science” complies: in its 
origins, it is a typically American leftist idea (originating from the same source as Marxism, 
namely, the longing for scientifi c positivism), according to which science regarding society 
can be built on thoroughly factual foundations with empirical methodology, enabling social 
engineers to draw necessary conclusions by measuring given attitudes (etc.) to predict 
future behaviour (etc.). Well, using “sterile morphology” (which fl ourished from the 
interwar period up to the 1950s, as marked by Talcott Parsons’ a-historically universalised 
analytical system of concepts) has today proved to be a dead end,29 re-admitting the old 
24 Patsch, F.: Dogmatikai kijelentések hermeneutikai fejlődése. (Egy »fundamentál-
hermeneutikai dogmatika« vázlata) [Hermeneutical development of dogmatic statements: outlines of 
a »fundamental-hermeneutical dogmatics«]. In: Rokay, Z. (ed.): Egység a különbözőségben. A 60 éves 
Bolberitz Pál köszöntése [Unity in diversity: Essays in honour of Pál Bolberitz on the occasion of his 
60th birthday]. Budapest, 2002. 117. et seq., especially para. 1.
25 The Book of Wisdom. 11:20. In: The New American Bible. see <http://www.vatican.va/
archive/ENG0839/__PLS.HTM>.
26 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Cultivating Scholarship under Communism. (A Case Study on Marxism and 
Law.) Central European Political Science Review, 13 (2011) 44. {Forthcoming}.
27 As a distorted outcome in law, cf. Varga, Cs.: Rule of Law? Mania of Law? On the Boundary 
between Rationality and Anarchy in America. In: Nótári, T.–Török, G. (eds): Prudentia Iuris Gentium 
Potestate. Ünnepi tanulmányok Lamm Vanda tiszteletére [Prudentia Iuris Gentium Potestate – Studies 
in Honor of Vanda Lamm]. Budapest, 2010. 492–504.
28 In overview, cf. Varga, Cs.: Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának dilemmái 
[Man elevating himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age]. In: Mezey, K. (ed.): Sodródó emberiség. 
Tanulmányok Várkonyi Nándor »Az ötödik ember« című művéről [Mankind adrift: on the work of 
Nándor Várkonyi’s »The Fifth Man«]. Budapest, 2000. 61–93.
29 Bell, D. In: Bullock, A.–Woodkings, R. B. (eds): The Fontana Dictionary of Modern 
Thinkers. London, 1983. 580. Cf. also Andreski, St.: Social Sciences as Sorcery. London, 1972.
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ideal of the Humanities, while admitting that when we approach the specifi cally human, 
something more is at stake than rational codifi ability alone.
Obviously, even more is at stake when we encounter the claim (rejuvenated after the 
failure of the one-time attempt to axiomatise ethics)30 that we should negotiate moral and 
social psychological issues on the pattern of classical analysis taken as conceptual 
mathematics, absolutising a methodology according to which–of course, for the sake and 
within the bounds of the given conceptual system–only that which can be rationally 
concluded and justifi ed is thinkable at all, while forgetting that human refl ection is by far 
more complex than that.31
Therefore, as against a mechanical world-concept symbolised by the ancient 
clockwork’s metaphor,32 our existence is nonetheless a total whole throughout: a totality 
resulting from the constant competition of interactions by practically unlimited sets of 
uninterrupted processes, (re)generated in autopoiesis, which inseparably closes its 
ontological and epistemological determinations and partial processes back into its total 
process. If we do not raise the issue as a theologically founded query (or if we reject, in the 
spirit of Occam’s classical methodological razor, the teleological moment that could be 
raised from the outset), then it remains an insoluble enigma whether or not that which we 
think of as a limit in terms of values in such processes can at the same time also be regarded 
as objective. Or, formulated as a paradox, is “objectivity” available at all when one insists 
on “pure” scholarship?33
5. The Ontological Necessity of Heterogeneity in Action
Returning again to economy, we have to conclude that without a vision of man in his entire 
complexity (including the theological, anthropological, ethical and psychological aspects as 
well), not even economy can be fully explained. Obviously, ethics is also necessary for 
economy as a desideratum in order to construct mentally and posit ontologically it. In other 
words, economic rationality is certainly at its proper place in previous calculation when we 
consider probabilities or take it into account as one of the criteria in managing confl icting 
situations, but it certainly cannot be the exclusive motivation to rely on in the operation of 
the overall complex. Or, ethics is by far not just a corrective, complementary factor in 
economy. This is of a foundational signifi cance, giving it a framework so that the issue of 
economic rationality itself can be raised at all.
As we have already remarked, in legal regulation the concept of a system (formulated 
by, e.g. Hugo Grotius at the dawn of the modern age), built up exhaustively and seamlessly 
in (natural) law and formed according to the ideal of mos geometricus as broken down into 
individual positivations according to logical necessity, was later replaced by the mere 
defi nition of basic principles and (somewhat as an added exemplifi cation) their arrangement 
30 Moore, G. E.: Principia Ethica. Cambridge, 1903.
31 Such a methodology can indeed be approved of in fi elds depending upon positivation that is, 
aimed at some strictly delimited and exclusively theoretical modelling that selects from the whole 
arbitrarily, but according to human purposes. If over-extended or extrapolated, then it also becomes 
problematic on its own terms.
32 Cf. Varga: Lectures… [note 17]. 84–85. Note 109.
33 See Hermerén, G. (ed.): Proceedings of the Symposium on Scientifi c Objectivity. Copenhagen: 
Munksgaard 1978. = Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 14 (1977).
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in rules and exceptions from rules, so that the various situations in life can be judged 
according to principles in a patterned but individualised way, bearing their total complexity 
in mind. Likewise in economy, morality serves as an ethos defi ning a general direction, 
while in individual situations it helps in balancing confl icts of values by mediating amongst 
diverging interests mutually considered, leading fi nally to compromise solutions. 
Consequently in economy, at the level of macro-processes, morality is an ontic component 
to serve as a foundation that makes economic rationality reasonable and also socially 
interpretable; while in micro-processes, it has also to be taken cognisance of in the 
background, aware of the fact that it almost never makes recourse directly and one-sidedly 
but through reconciliatory processes, in order to solve confl icts and reach compromises by 
balancing, mediating, and mutual consideration.
It is exactly such a duality that opens up to both further requirements and additional 
wide-ranging prospects that may prove to be useful in our procedures at any time, for in 
macro-relations (e.g. in patterns proposed by medical law), it is exactly ethical 
considerations that generate the alternative models that we can endow, through strategic 
planning and a series of tactical decisions, with a defi nite patterning function, standardised 
as comprehensive social policies, after their harmonisation with prevailing economic and 
legal policies is accomplished; while in micro-relations, we have to provide for its 
exemplary operations through education, socialisation, and case analysis, caring for the 
diverse particularity of individual situations with proper empathy, after our ultimate goals 
are also taken into account.
With this, we have opted for the demand for human entirety, encouraged to avail 
ourselves of the potentialities offered by specialisation and homogenisation in our complex 
age with good conscience, but at all times in such a way as not to miss the ultimate goal, 
the intention–desirably a guide for all our human actions–of effectively implementing 
fundamental values in practice.34
34 For earlier attempts at outlining a theoretical framework, see Varga, Cs.: Doctrine and 
Technique in Law. Iustum Aequum Salutare IV (2008), 23–37 and <http://www.jak.ppke.hu/hir/
ias/20081sz/02.pdf> and <www.univie.ac.at/RI/IRIS2004/Arbeitspapierln/Publikationsfreigabe/
Csaba_Phil/Csaba_Phil.doc> as well as Varga, Cs.: Buts et moyens en droit. In: Loiodice, A.–Vari, M. 
(eds): Giovanni Paolo II. Le vie della giustizia: Itinerari per il terzo millennio. (Omaggio dei giuristi 
a Sua Santità nel XXV anno di pontifi cato.) Roma, 2003. 71–75 and Goals and Means in Law: or 
Janus-faced Abstract Rights. [Tikslai ir priemonės teisėje.] Jurisprudencija [Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio 
Universitetas] (2005) 68(60), 5–10 and <http://www.mruni.lt/padaliniai/leidyba/jurisprudencija/
juris60.pdf>.
